



### Internet Peering Concepts and Trends

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- > The Internet for the Future
- Peering Intro and Internet Trends
- Peering Network Design
- Peering Network Telemetry
- Peering Security
- > Future

#### The Internet for the Future

#### **New Normals**


For the way we Work, Live, Play, and Learn

#### **New Participants**

Many remain unconnected and emerging IoT


#### **New Potentials**

The foundation of economies, governments, and societies




### Critical Infrastructure

Requires Mass-scale, Trustworthy Networks




### The Exponential Growth of the Internet

The Story of the Emperor, Inventor, and the Game of Chess



## The Internet Enters the 2<sup>nd</sup> Half of the Chessboard

By 2022, Massive Scale Grows Even Larger



### Akamai Internet Station

Welcome to your source for global network traffic and security data from the world's largest edge platform

#### **CURRENT GLOBAL TRENDS**

JAN 06, 2023 05:11:18 GMT

#### 3B hits/minute

Past 24 hours

GLOBAL PAGE VIEWS GLOBAL STREAMS

7 Tbps
Past 24 hours

110M Past 24 hours

DAILY ATTACKS

### The New Era is here

>75%
of all Internet traffic will be video
Up from 60% in 2018

66%

Of the population will be using internet by 2023

Up from 51% in 2018

66%
connected flat-panel TV
sets will be 4K
Up from 33% in 2018

110 Mbps
Average broadband speed
Up from 45.9Mbps in 2018

3.6
Networked devices and connections per person
Up from 2.4 in 2018


44 Mbps
Average mobile speed
Up from 13.2Mbps in 2018

### Challenges for Service Providers

Bandwidth Continues to Grow 50% Year-over-Year

#### The world has gone mobile


Changing Customer Expectations With AI, VR





Ubiquitous Access to Apps & Services

#### Massive IP traffic growth, driven by video



#### Rise of cloud computing

Changing SP Architectures/ Service Delivery






#### Digitization leading to IoT

Emergence of the Internet of Things



### Market Dynamics



### The SP Market Is Subject to Five Megatrends



Explosive growth of video and mobile



Advent of 5G



Changing subscriber user experience



Rise of cloud and web scale players



Cyber security

- Traffic growth driven by video (>80% in 2022) and unlimited plans
- SPs' networks to evolve into crossmedium, converged delivery networks
- Service awareness and enablement
- Network assurance, policy, and SLA for Enterprises
- Integration across multiple networks
- Self-service / control / immediacy
- Majority of traffic to originate from a small number of content providers
- Emerging
   Distributed Cloud requirements
- Widening attack surfaces and increasing rate of attacks
- Multiplication of IoT endpoints / DDoS


### Five Architectural Shifts Redefining SP Networks

- 1 Convergence
  - 2 Subscriber Experience
    - 3 Compute and Storage
      - 4 Peering
        - 5 Automation

### **Next Generation Requirements**

- High availability (5 9s+)
- Fast converging (targeting now < .5 sec)</li>
- Low latency (<50ms) and low jitter for real time communication services</li>
- Unicast and multicast traffic (Layer 2 or Layer 3)
- Ultra-High Scalability (thousands to 100,000+ nodes, global scale)
- Traffic Engineering and Steering as needed
- Architectures driven by business objectives
- Fault-domain isolation and service segmentation
- Simplicity
- · Greater Efficiency (higher average utilization)
- Secure and Programmable Infrastructure
- Maintenance with little to no customer impact

### Next Generation Architectural Decisions



- High Capacity and Scale
- Software Defined & Controller Based
- Virtualized
- Automated
- A Combination of Hardware and Software Worlds


### A New Era in Network Architectures



IP NGN Era	Intent Driven Networks
Designed to support a set of services	Designed to support any kind of services
Static traffic patterns	Dynamic traffic patterns
Manual configuration (CLI)	Automation (APIs, Controllers,)
Apps Independent of Network	App & Network Interaction


APPLICATIONS

### IP and Optical Networks Today



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## IP and Optical Networks Evolution Converged SDN Transport




### Our new reality...



- "The Internet is Essential"
- Netflix Streaming effect
- Huge Spike in Webex use
- Sustained Busy Hours

## How has Peering changed? "Flattening" of the Internet powered by 2 major transitions



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### What is Peering?

"Peering is the interconnection and exchange of IP data between two networks under different administrative control."

Peering is the glue holding together the Internet, without it the flow of data across the Internet would not be possible.

Peering represents an important administrative, operational, and security boundary between IP networks.

"Peering" in 2020 = Interconnection covering Content Delivery, Business to Business Services, and Traditional Peering

While the fundamental role of peering hasn't changed, traffic patterns, location, operation, and security requirements have, so peering must evolve as well.

#### Internet Evolution

#### "Public" Internet circa 1995

- Low bandwidth clients, dial-up
- Many smaller regional Internet providers
- ~16M users
- Wireline only
- Static content
- More widespread content sources contributed to volume





#### Today's Internet

- High-speed Internet is widely available
- 100s of millions mobile users
- 4 billion+ users worldwide
- Static content replaced with video
- Traffic volume driven by fewer sources
- Leads to "flattening" of Internet: Direct interconnection between producer and consumer networks




### Interconnection Types

#### Public Fabric



- Easy to connect to many peers
- IXP can provide redundancy


#### Private Interconnect



- High traffic volume
- Independent capacity

- Public or private fabrics interconnect many networks worldwide
- Highest percentage of traffic volume today carried over PNI
- Largest SP and content providers trending to more PNI
- CDN is a type of PNI, may or may not include BGP

### "Peering" vs. Transit



### Interconnection Growth


In 1995, ~20 IXPs, today more than 700 worldwide



### What content is dominating Internet traffic?


**26% CAGR** 2017-2022






### Where is traffic coming from?

CDNs will deliver 72 percent of Internet traffic by 2022




### "Flattening" of the Internet




- AS Path represents the number of BGP "hops" a prefix traverses
- Even with many more providers, the length has not increased
- Increased density and not increased width
- Graph shows 2012 but trend has continued relatively unchanged

### Internet Global Routing Table by Numbers

67057 unique ASNs in global BGP routing table 817505 IPv4 prefixes, 80514 IPv6 prefixes








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### Towards a more resilient peering fabric



Traditional Peering




OR




· Horizontal scaling adds resiliency

- Less reliance on long-haul backup for metro or DC Peering
- Reduced blast radius during maintenance or failure
- Simplified SR control-plane




- Greater resiliency and capacity scale
- Optimized feature sets at each layer
- Optimized fabric for both ingress and egress content delivery

### Network function separation



### Peering Location - SP Services DC




- Localize peering close to user service termination
- Requires flexibility to connect both traditional BGP peering and content caches

### Content Provider Cache Aggregation

#### **Peering Facility**

# CDN switch, router, or direct to cache SP Network


#### Distributed Cache in Agg/Access



### How do I influence peering traffic patterns?

Inbound Traffic	Detail
Prefix Advertisement	Suppression, longer prefixes
MED (multi-homed peer)	Some peers (transit) will listen to MEDs and carry traffic over their network to reach yours Typically set to IGP metric
AS Path Length	AS_PATH length influences peer route selection, prepending used for ingress TE
Outbound Traffic	Detail
Local Preference	Highest priority BGP attribute used for path selection
MED	"Metric" attribute also used in outbound path selection
TE Methods (SR-TE, RSVP- TE, EPE)	Steer traffic to specific location or peer using TE overlay methods

### Hot potato vs. cold potato routing



- Hot potato (red) has routing policy to always route 10.0.0.0/24 to closest AS1->AS2 interconnect
- Cold potato (blue) carries traffic across AS1 network to AS1→AS2 interconnect point closest to final AS2 destination
- Transit providers (paid) will typically use cold potato, peers will be use hot potato

# Inter-AS Ingress Peer Traffic Engineering

#### Traditional BGP Methods

- Disaggregation
- Advertisement Suppression
- AS-Prepend
- No guarantees

#### Content Provider Peering

Most allow influence by community

# SR-TE Egress Peer Engineering - Traffic Steering

- Static routing
  - Route IPv4/IPv6 routes into a defined SR Policy
- BGP Flowspec
  - Use BGP-FS rule to direct traffic into a SR Policy or VRF using SR for reachability to egress nodes
- Per-Flow Traffic Steering
  - Utilize CoS markings to map inbound traffic to specific SR Policies
  - Can use QPPB to mark traffic based on destination BGP attributes prior to steering


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# Peering Data Provides Network Insights for Planning, Policy and Control



#### Periodic Streaming Telemetry

- Data is collected on node, "pushed" to collection entity at periodic intervals
- Cisco calls this model-driven telemetry (MDT)
- Best suited for time-series data, EG: interface statistics, router CPU
- Can also apply to network topology, EG: delay measurement between nodes
- Optimized data collection and optimized transport
- NETCONF/RESTCONF subscriptions can also be considered "streaming telemetry"


#### **Event Driven Telemetry**

- Data is pushed asynchronously from node based on state change or monitored event
- SNMP Traps, Syslog, Cisco EEM, Junos event scripts, and RMON are examples of existing event driven telemetry
- Modern approaches use YANG models and same structured encoding as periodic streaming telemetry
- BGP Monitoring Protocol (BMP) can also be thought of as event-driven telemetry

### Model-Driven Telemetry for Peering

#### Higher Resolution Metric Data


- Quickly detect anomalies when coupled with thresholds or machine learning
- Increased visibility into traffic patterns
- Expose hidden oscillations
- See instant impact of network changes or maintenance events



#### Network and Device Health Monitoring

- Monitoring queuing resources, can be important across peering or fabric where ingress/egress interfaces are the same speed. Similar in concept to datacenter microburst detection
- Monitor hardware FIB capacity and RIB memory

# Easily Build Peering Dashboards



### **BGP Monitoring Protocol**


Support in NX-OS, IOS-XR, and IOS-XE



BMP Message Type	Data	
Route Monitoring	Per-peer NLRI and ongoing NLRI updates	
Statistics Report	14 periodic stats values, EG: denied prefixes, RIB counts	
Peer Down Notification	Peer down, includes local/remote notification msg	
Peer Up Notification	Peer in Established state, includes open msg	
Peer Up Notification Initiation Message	Peer in Established state, includes open msg sysName, sysDescr, additional info	
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
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#### BMP Route Monitoring Points




### BMP Security Use Cases and Resources

- Monitor peers and prefixes for instability
- Monitor peers for "bad" attributes such as invalid/private ASNs, long ASN lengths, internal communities, bogon prefixes etc.
- Forensic analysis of routing events, having a historical log of routing changes can be invaluable in root cause analysis
- Use diff from pre-policy to easily detect specific rejected prefixes



#### Streaming Network Analytics System Sample Report



#### Netflow / IPFIX

- Has been around for many years
- Cisco Netflow v9 latest Netflow version
- IPFIX IETF standard flow export
- Peering BGP data must be associated with flow information to be the most meaningful bgp attribute-download in XR
- Modern traffic rates require sampling.
   1:4000 is sufficient for accurate traffic modeling, but dimension for your network
- Application-level visibility is becoming more difficult with encrypted traffic increasing, but peering data is only reliant on SRC/DST IP and still valid

#### Capacity planning use cases

- "Who should I peer with?"
- "Where should I peer with X,Y,Z?"
- "Should I build local peering or add caching to optimize my network?"
- "Should I change my network topology?"

# Peering Capacity Planning

- Derive traffic matrix
  - SR Traffic Matrix
  - RSVP-TE tunnels
  - Netflow flow source router/interface to egress interface
- Develop network growth model
  - Use historical data to grow interfaces and links at realistic rates, not the same rate across all links
  - Machine learning, or humans, can add intelligence to the model over time. Filter anomalies and predict seasonal changes
- Simulate network failures
  - Balance cost vs. consumer experience and SLAs

### Resources for Finding Peers

- Peering DB
  - www.peeringdb.net
  - Database of peering locations, who is peering at those locations, and what their peering policies are
- Networking and Peering Conferences
  - NANOG, RIPE, APRICOT, etc.
  - Meet other providers and IXP organizers
  - Negotiate peering terms and interconnection cost
- Content cache providers
  - Netflix OpenConnect
  - Google Global Cache
  - Akamai
  - Apple

# Cisco Peering Telemetry Open Source

Application	Collection Method	Use Cases
SNAS Streaming Network Analytics System	BMP (BGP Monitoring Protocol) BGP-LS	BGP performance monitoring BGP security monitoring BGP routing anomalies IGP topology BGP looking glass
() telegraf	Model-Driven Telemetry Open-source collector with Cisco MDT plugins in mainline release	Collect, process, and output router telemetry GNMi or static configuration Input gRPC,JSON telemetry data Output to Telegraf supported streams (Kafka, InfluxDB, etc.)

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### Peering Edge Security Threats

Leading Threat Concerns\*

DDoS Attack (88%)

Infrastructure Security (55%)

BGP Route Hijacking (25%) Description


Distributed Denial of Service Volumetric traffic to overwhelm network and hosts

Compromise of network control-plane Compromise of network devices

Man-in-the-middle attack ASN hijacking has also been an issue

### Peering DDoS Mitigation - RTBH

- Remote Triggered Black Hole
  - Applicable for content, SP, enterprise
  - Black hole could be sinkhole, honey pot
- S/RTBH
  - Drop based on source address and not destination
  - Uses Unicast RPF with BGP NH set to /32 with static route to Null0
- Upstream providers will often match specific community to allow customers to trigger RTBH (see resources for more info)
- Cymru has UTRS, global RTBH network



### Peering DDoS Mitigation - BGP Flowspec

- New AFI/SAFI NLRI, IPv4 defined in RFC5575, IPv6 nearing RFC status
- Distribute data-plane ACLs using MP-BGP
- Match on packet criteria then drop, police, redirect, or mark matched traffic
- Foundation for scalable distributed D@oS protection

#### Server Config

```
class-map type traffic match-all memcached
match destination-port 11211
match protocol udp tcp
end-class-map
!


policy-map type pbr drop-memcached
class type traffic memcached
drop
!
class type traffic class-default
!
end-policy-map
!
flowspec
address-family ipv4
service-policy type pbr drop-memcached
```

#### Client Config

flowspec address-family ipv4 local-install interface-all

### Peering DDoS Mitigation - Full Solution


- Granular Netflow helps identify attacks faster
- High scale 5-tuple ACLs block high-volume identified traffic
- BGP Flowspec automates traffic filtering, policing, and redirection
- SR-TE to steer and loadbalance traffic to end scrubbers



,

#### DDoS Traffic Steering using SR-TE and BGP-FS

- BGP Flowspec redirects traffic to SR Policy
- SR-TE to steer and loadbalance traffic to end scrubber/DPI
- Manually defined EPE SID in XR 7.1.1



# DDoS Traffic Steering using SR-TE and BGP-FS

#### Head-end Configuration


```
segment-routing
traffic-eng
 segment-list pr1-ddos-1
  index 1 mpls label 16441
  index 2 mpls label 28000
 segment-list pr1-ddos-2
  index 1 mpls label 16441
  index 2 mpls label 28001
 policy pr1 ddos1 epe
  color 999 end-point ipv4
192,168,14,4
   candidate-paths
    preference 500
    explicit segment-list pr1-ddos-1
     explicit segment-list pr1-ddos-2
     weight 100
```

# Per-flow load balances across equal weight paths

```
SR-TE policy database
Color: 999, End-point: 192.168.14.4
  Name: srte c 999 ep 192.168.14.4
  Status:
    Admin: up Operational: up for 00:17:25
  Candidate-paths:
    Preference: 500 (configuration) (active)
      Name: pr1 ddos1 epe
      Requested BSID: dynamic
      PCC info:
        Symbolic name: cfg pr1 ddos1 epe discr 500
        PLSP-ID: 517
      Explicit: segment-list pr1-ddos-1 (valid)
        Weight: 100, Metric Type: TE
          16441
          28000
      Explicit: segment-list pr1-dddos-2 (valid)
        Weight: 100, Metric Type: TE
          16441
          28001
  Attributes:
    Binding SID: 25384
    Forward Class: 0
    Steering BGP disabled: no
   IPv6 caps enable: yes
```

# Increasing BGP Session Security with TCP-AO

- Session threats
  - TCP RST attacks
  - Snooping
  - SYN flooding
  - Peering is being used for more critical applications than just best-effort Internet



- Question: When was TCP MD5 authentication obsoleted?
  - Answer: Obsoleted in 2010
- TCP-AO TCP Authentication Option RFC 5925
  - Use HMAC-SHA2-256 hash at minimum
  - Protects BGP TCP connection by authenticating TCP segments
  - Does NOT provide session encryption
  - Supported in IOS-XR in 6.5.3, IOS-XE in 16.12
  - Recommended in RFC 7454 (2015)

### TCP-AO IOS-XR Configuration

#### Key chain and TCP AO Config

```
tcp ao
  keychain TCP-AO-KEY
  key 1 SendID 100 ReceiveID 100
!
!
key chain TCP-AO-KEY
  key 1
  accept-lifetime 00:00:00 january 01 2018 infinite
  key-string password 0204034B0A131B29
  send-lifetime 00:00:00 january 01 2018 infinite
  cryptographic-algorithm AES-128-CMAC-96
```

#### **BGP Configuration**

```
router bgp 100
neighbor 1.2.3.4
remote-as 101
ao TCP-AO-KEY include-tcp-options enable
```

# Infrastructure Security using Peering in a VRF

# Peering in VRFs GRT in default VRF

- Isolate peers for data-plane security
- Import only specific peer routes into customer VRFs

#### All "Internet" in VRF


- Base infrastructure isolated from user and service traffic
- BGP diversity using RD instead of add-path extensions
- EBGP peers share same Internet VRF

#### Peering in VRFs GRT in "Internet" VRF

- Isolate peers for dataplane security
- Base infrastructure isolated from user and service traffic
- Control inbound/outbound routing using RT

#### Internet in a VRF with Peer Isolation

PFL node performs import/export between Peer VRF and INET VRF



Traffic sent to 172.16.0.0/24 from Peer A is dropped

VRF A	10.0.0.0/24 10.1.1.0/24	
10.0.0.0/24 10.1.1.0/24	192.168.1.0/24	INET VRF
192.168.1.0/24		172.16.0.0/24
	9.0124	172.17.0.0/24
VRF B	172.16.0.0124 172.17.0.0124	10.0.0.0/24 10.1.1.0/24
172.16.0.0/24 172.17.0.0/24	192.168.1.8 24	192.168.1.0/24 (SP Route)
192.168.1.0/24	A BEE	

RT	VRF Purpose
65000:500	Provider Routes
65000:101	Peer
65000:999	Internet

### Data Plane Boundary Concerns

- Scanning vulnerability probes and botnet C&C
- Volumetric and application-layer DoS
- CoS value retention
- Spoofed traffic
- Infrastructure attack traffic to peering edge, DNS, and other critical services

# Ingress Traffic

- What should I do at the edge?
  - Filter control-plane traffic to internal infrastructure
  - Filter well-known bad traffic that won't cause user issues (chargen, etc.)
  - Fragments? Source of many attacks but may not be feasible
  - Explicitly reset CoS values on ingress
  - Monitor everything, characterize steady-state and rate-limit if you can
  - Follow security alerts from US-CERT (<a href="https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts">https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts</a>),
     CVE feeds and other security organizations
- CDN is still an unsecured edge device
- Use BGP-FS for transient dynamic events, use stateless ACLs for well-defined long-term filters
- Route dark (unused) space to honeypot servers for threat inspection and research

### Egress Traffic Filtering - Much the same as ingress

Follow BCP 38 for ingress filtering on downstream connections ©

Use strict filtering based on well-maintained data

Known bad protocols with no current legitimate Internet use

Automation is key to deploying filters quickly so your customers are not actors in attacks

### **Best Practices Summary**

- TCP-AO session authentication with strong encryption (AES)
  - TCP-AO available in IOS-XR 6.5.1 w/stronger crypto algorithms
  - MD5 as a lowest common denominator
- Control-plane policing per-peer, default in IOS-XR
- Reset IPP, DSCP, EXP on inbound peering traffic
- Delete inbound communities, especially if doing VRF peering, some vendors may accept routes with an RT set from an EBGP neighbor
- · Limit BGP control-plane to only configured peers
- Data-plane filters inbound and outbound
  - If feasible whitelist your own IP space at edge
  - Automation is key in maintaining accuracy
- Review BCP 84,194, and BCP 38 if you are providing Internet service

#### Summary

**Peering Infrastructure** 

- High frequency Netflow, BMP, and Model-Driven Telemetry Export
- Control-Plane Policers Per-Peer
- BGP MD5, GTSM Support

**BGP Prefix Security** 

- Powerful IOS-XR Routing Policy Language (RPL)
- BMP ADJ-RIB-In Pre and Post Policy
- RPKI ROA Support, RFC8212 Default Deny

SP Network

- Peer and Internet isolation using validated Peering and Internet in a VRF
- IPv4 and IPv6 BGP Flowspec
- Integration with Leading DDoS Detection and Mitigation Platforms

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- > The Internet for the Future
- > Peering Intro and Internet Trends
- Peering Network Design
- Peering Network Telemetry
- Peering Security
- > Future

### Today's trends continue

- Requires flexible hardware with low power footprint
- In SP networks we will continue to see peering and CDN distributed deeper in the network close to users
- Continued "compartmentalization" of the Internet as long-haul traffic levels drop over time
- Continued focus on security and peering operations
- Continued enhancements in BGP Flowspec
  - PCEP drafts on BGP-FS via PCEP
  - Flexible FS redirect based on defined Segment Routing SID list

### Additional Peering Resources

- · Cisco Peering Fabric HLD
  - https://xrdocs.io/design/blogs/latest-peering-fabric-hld
    - Details on best practices, validated model driven telemetry
- https://github.com/cisco-ie/anx to explore NETCONF and telemetry paths
- http://www.team-cymru.com/
  - Resource for security best practices, BOGON API feed
- https://onestep.net/communities/
  - · List of communities supported by SPs to trigger route behavior
- IETF working groups

1. .

- IDR (Inter-Domain Routing)
- SIDR (Secure Inter-Domain Routing, now closed)
- SIDROPS (Secure Inter-Domain Routing Ops)
- GROW (Global Routing Operations)

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#### **Reference**

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